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Overview — This paper broadly examines the scientific, regulatory, and
economic factors that contribute to constrained vaccine production capac-
ity, periodic vaccine shortages, and perceptions of inadequate investment
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and production processes and summarizes how regulatory requirements
influence these activities. Market dynamics related to vaccine supply and
demand are also explored, including an examination of the industry’s cost
structure, potential market size, and purchaser price sensitivity. A broad
range of policy interventions designed to address shortcomings of the vac-
cine market are considered.
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The Vaccine Industry:
Does It Need a Shot in the Arm?
Vaccines were among the first “wonder drugs” to radically transform
human health and longevity. In doing so, they also permanently altered
public expectations of medical science.
Infectious diseases were once the greatest threat to public health and the
leading cause of death. Advances in vaccine development, combined with
improved sanitation and antibiotics, have greatly reduced the threat of infec-
tious disease such that most Americans are unaware of lingering dangers.
The American public has come to expect that vaccines will be available to
protect them against most infectious diseases and that policy interven-
tions will be pursued if that availability is compromised. Vaccines are
unique among pharmaceutical products—they prevent, rather than treat,
disease; they protect communities, as well as individuals. The preventive
and collective benefits of vaccines create a powerful public interest in
ensuring the availability of these products. Despite their promises of pro-
tection from disease, vaccines have provoked controversy and troubled
policymakers since the first vaccination in 1796.
Recent headlines underscore the current concerns related to vaccines:
shortages of childhood vaccines, long lines at flu shot clinics, skepticism
regarding vaccine safety, and fears related to bioterror and avian flu
threats. All illustrate the negative way vaccines are viewed by the public.
These headlines also suggest there are problems in the vaccine market
that threaten to undermine availability of existing vaccines and hinder
the development of new products that could offer superior, more exten-
sive disease protection.
THE VACCINE PRODUCT
Traditional vaccines are substances developed in a laboratory setting that
stimulate the body’s immune system to prevent or control an infection by a
bacterial or viral agent. (Therapeutic vaccines serve a different purpose;
see sidebar, page 6.) Vaccines are typically made from “attenuated” live
microorganisms (or “microbes”); inactivated, whole microorganisms; iso-
lated components of a microbe; or materials, such as toxins, produced by a
disease-causing agent. Vaccine products can be administered orally; injected
into the skin, muscle, or bloodstream; or inhaled as an aerosol.
Vaccines are highly specific to the particular disease agent from which they
are derived. In some ways, they mimic the disease-causing agent in order
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to stimulate the immune system to produce an-
tibodies against it. Ideally, once the body
“learns” to create the antibody to ward off a spe-
cific disease, it retains the memory of the anti-
gen presented by the vaccine and will produce
antibodies in response to the antigen if exposed
to it again. In this way, vaccines are meant to
“teach” the body how to fight off the targeted
disease-causing agent.
Currently the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has licensed 51 vaccine products for use
in the United States, offering protection against
21 infectious diseases, as shown in Table 1  (next
page). Some of these products are combination
vaccines that protect against multiple diseases.
Vaccines have also been developed for some in-
fectious disease threats beyond those identified
in Table 1. However, these vaccines are not avail-
able in the U.S. market either because they were
withdrawn from the market (such as the chol-
era vaccine) or because market approval from
the FDA for these products has not yet been
sought or granted (such as the tick-borne en-
cephalitis vaccine1).
The effectiveness of different vaccines targeting
the same disease-causing agent can vary de-
pending on how each vaccine is made and ad-
ministered. In general, “live” vaccines provide
a more potent immune response but may also
pose greater safety risks relative to inactivated
or “killed” vaccines. Some vaccines are suitable
for adult populations but are inappropriate for,
or untested in, pediatric populations.
Research and Development
Like all pharmaceutical products, vaccine products require market approval
from the FDA before they can be sold. To secure such approval, manufactur-
ers must conduct laboratory and clinical research to prove the safety and
efficacy of their products. This product-focused research and development
is predicated on basic research that explores the physiological and genetic
makeup of microorganisms, the human immune response, and the ways in
which microbes interact with human host cells, often using animal models.
This type of basic research triggers “vaccine discovery” efforts to identify
and test potential antigens that could be targets for a vaccine-induced
immune response. Such research also aids the development of techniques
Common Vaccine-Related Terms
Adjuvant – A substance, such as salt or oil, that
increases the immune response to a given antigen.
Antibody – A substance produced by the body in
response to the presence of a specific antigen. The
body uses antibodies to bind antigens and to pre-
vent and fight disease.
Antigen – A substance that triggers an immune
response. Antigens derived from a micro-
organism’s outer surface, such as proteins, are
typically most effective in prompting an immune
response that prevents infection and protects
against disease.
Attenuation – The process of reducing the viru-
lence of a microorganism, often as a result of con-
tinued growth in an artificial host or culture system.
Conjugate Vaccine – Created by attaching a weak
antigen, such as a polysaccharide, to a protein to
elicit a stronger, longer-lasting immune response.
Young children do not respond to polysaccharide
vaccines; conjugates are sometimes used to con-
fer immunity for this population.
Stablizers – Materials that protect the vaccine
from environmental factors, such as temperature,
light, and humidity which could erode the
vaccine’s effectiveness.
Toxoid – A toxin rendered harmless, but still ca-
pable of acting as an antigen.
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TABLE 1
Number of Licensed Vaccine Products for Viruses and Toxins, 2005
Licensed Vaccine
Disease (Vaccine Target) Products (Uses) Manufacturers
Anthrax 1 1
(B. Anthracis)
Diphtheria 11* (5 adult*/booster, 4
(C. diphtheriae toxin) 6 pediatric)
Hepatitis A Virus 3 2
Hepatitis B Virus 5 2
Influenza A and B 4 (4 adult, 4
2 pediatric)
Japanese Encephalitis Virus 1 1
Measles (Rubeola) Virus 4 1
Meningitis 4 3
(H. influenzae b or HIB)
Meningococcal disease 2 1
(N. meningitides)
Mumps Virus 4 1
Pneumonia 2 (1 adult, 2
(S. pneumoniae) 1 pediatric)
Polio Virus 3* 2
Rabies Virus 3* 3
Rubella Virus 3 1
Smallpox Virus 1 1
Tetanus 14* 3
(C. tetani toxin)
Tuberculosis 2 2
(M. tuberculosi, M. bovis or BCG)
Typhoid Fever 2 2
(S. typhi)
Chicken Pox/Varicella Virus 2 2
Yellow Fever Virus 1 1
Whooping Cough or Pertussis 4 3
(B. pertussis)
*One product not currently marketed.
Source: Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, “Vaccines Licensed for Immunization and Distri-
bution in the US,” Food and Drug Administration, updated September 9, 2005; available at www.fda.gov/
cber/vaccine/licvacc.htm
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for producing and isolating these antigenic agents and for assessing the
immune protection offered by vaccine candidates. Basic and vaccine dis-
covery research is generally conducted by universities, small biotechnol-
ogy companies, and some large pharmaceutical companies. Through the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Defense (DoD),
and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the federal
government plays a major role in funding and, in some instances, di-
rectly conducting research related to vaccine discovery.2
If a vaccine candidate emerges from the discovery research, clinical trials
in human subjects are used to test the safety and effectiveness of the po-
tential vaccine. The four phases of this research, which mirror the struc-
ture of pre-market clinical research for chemically based pharmaceutical
compounds, are described here.
Phase I — Phase I trials are typically limited to a small number of partici-
pants (20 to 80) and are frequently begun in adults and then include chil-
dren if they are likely to be vaccinated with the candidate product.3 These
trials seek to gather preliminary data on the safety of the vaccine and its
ability to trigger an immune response. Vaccine candidates that elicit an
immune response are said to be immunogenic. Phase I trials are consid-
ered part of the discovery phase and, if the results of these limited trials
are promising, vaccine development will begin.
Phase II — Phase II trials involve a larger number of participants (often
several hundred). Phase II trials can be divided into two broad categories.
Phase IIa studies seek to validate the preliminary data on safety and im-
munogenicity generated in Phase I trials. Phase IIb studies can be used to
obtain more precise data on the magnitude
of immune response as it relates to dosage
and dose intervals, and they can also be
focused on the populations for whom the
vaccine is likely to be recommended. Al-
though the data generated through IIb tri-
als can sometimes provide a good sense
of the vaccine candidate’s efficacy, these
estimates are too imprecise to be used for
securing licensure. Candidate vaccines
found to be safe and immunogenic will
require additional study before market
approval is granted.
Phase III — Phase III trials are large,
randomized, double-blind, placebo-
controlled studies that may enroll tens of
thousands of participants.4 These studies
validate the safety and immunogenicity
data generated through Phases I and II in
a much larger and more diverse segment
Therapeutic Vaccines
Advances in immunology have led to the development
of “therapeutic vaccines.” Therapeutic vaccines differ dra-
matically from the traditional vaccines in two ways: (i) they
are intended to treat an existing disease rather than provide
preventive protection and (ii) many of the therapeutic vac-
cine approaches are specifically formulated for individual
patients, often relying on clinical specimens from the pa-
tient, such as white blood cells, to create the vaccine. Al-
though these vaccines stimulate an immune response they
do not have broad, population-wide application.
Therapeutic vaccines for cancer are being investigated as
ways to increase the body’s natural defense response to can-
cer antigens.  The vaccines are being developed based on
increased understanding of how the immune system re-
sponds and why certain cancerous cells are not identified
by the immune system until tumors have begun to develop.
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of the overall population. Phase III studies also measure vaccine efficacy
and safety among vaccine recipients relative to a control group, usually
placebo recipients.
Phase III studies generally seek to demonstrate that the actual incidence
of disease in vaccine recipients is significantly lower than the disease in-
cidence in placebo recipients. Determining whether the immune response
triggered by the vaccine actually confers disease protection requires long-
term observation of study participants, often for two to three years.
Because ethical considerations preclude an immediate, direct disease chal-
lenge (meaning, direct intentional exposure to the disease-causing agent),
study participants must be monitored over time to see if they are pro-
tected from the disease-causing agent. The number of participants in such
trials often needs to be very large, especially for vaccines directed against
disease agents that are relatively uncommon.
Phase III trials also seek to prove a relationship between disease protec-
tion and the presence of immune response markers, such as antibody
levels. Establishing such relationships allows subsequent studies of sub-
populations to focus on these biomarkers, avoiding the protracted time
frame required to observe disease incidence. Similarly, Phase III trials of
vaccines directed at disease agents that are not naturally prevalent (such as
those from bioterror threats) will be limited to measuring an immunologi-
cal response, such as serum antibody level. These response markers can be
correlated to actual disease protection, as demonstrated in animal models.
The costs of product development, particularly Phase III trials, are gen-
erally thought to be higher for vaccines than for pharmaceuticals. Be-
cause vaccines are given to healthy people, regulatory tolerance for
health risks associated with these products tends to be extremely low.
Vaccine trials are typically much larger than those conducted for
pharmaceutical products because of this risk-averse orientation, as well
as the need to test the product through a trial that appropriately repre-
sents the broad population intended for vaccination.
Development of Vaccine for Human Papilloma Virus
Eight years have passed since Merck’s discovery of a candidate
vaccine for HPV. The pharmaceutical company is still awaiting
final approval for market use.
4 years 3 years 1 year (or more)
Exploration of safety and effects
of vaccine on immune response
Development of scaleable
processes and clinical supplies
Measurement of vaccine safety
and efficacy
Application for FDA approval and
regulatory review
Discovery
of candidate
vaccine
Phases I & II Phases III
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Regulatory tolerance of risk tends to be balanced against the perceived
benefits of the pharmaceutical product. Because vaccine products are given
to healthy persons, the vaccine’s benefits are a function of both the preva-
lence of the disease targeted and the extent to which the vaccine decreases
the morbidity and mortality risks of that disease. In some cases, rare ad-
verse events associated with a similar, previously marketed product can
lead regulators to require very large trials to guard against safety risks.
For example, some believe that very large trial size requirements were
imposed on the recent trial of Aventis Pasteur’s rotavirus vaccine due to
infrequent but severe adverse events associated with a Wyeth rotavirus
product that was ultimately pulled from the market.
Phase IV — FDA frequently asks for sizeable post-marketing studies to
examine ancillary questions such as the effect of use on extended popula-
tions (that is, beyond the group for which the vaccine is initially intended)
or for potential side effects with other medications already in use. These
large follow-up studies have become almost a standard feature in the vac-
cine field, adding to the total cost for getting a new product established in
the market. Though such studies answer important safety questions, they
are perceived by some as commanding clinical trial resources that might
otherwise be devoted to the development of more new vaccines.
Although government plays an important role in vaccine discovery and
occasionally sponsors vaccine development work, the vaccine industry is
primarily responsible for moving a vaccine beyond the “proof of con-
cept” stage to a marketable product. Industry generally funds clinical
trials in Phases II, III, and IV, although much of this industry-sponsored
research may be conducted by universities and academic medical centers
through research contracts. The industry is also the dominant sponsor for
product development–related research. These types of research efforts
focus on taking biological materials identified and produced in a small
laboratory setting and turning these materials into products that can be
manufactured on an industrial scale. Much of this research is conducted
directly by large pharmaceutical companies. In 2000, the leading vaccine
manufacturers spent approximately $750 million on all research and de-
velopment efforts, representing about 15 to 20 percent of vaccine revenues.5
Product Equals Process
In many ways the vaccine “product” is actually the process used to create
the vaccine. Legal recognition of vaccine products (found in both regula-
tory frameworks and intellectual property rights) are highly dependent
on adherence to a defined production process, as opposed to chemical
identification of the vaccine itself, because of the difficulties inherent in
characterizing a product derived from a biological entity.
Unlike drug products, vaccines cannot be chemically analyzed to deter-
mine identity or composition, and potency or dosage is not a simple func-
tion of molecular weight. The precise nature of these biological products
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in general has not been not fully defined, and the molecular properties
that confer immune protection are not wholly understood. Furthermore,
because vaccine products are based on living, adaptive organisms, small
variations in the production process could potentially alter the organism,
and therefore the vaccine, in unknowable ways. These alterations could
have a profound impact on the product’s safety or effectiveness.6
Regulatory requirements — Because the end product of vaccine pro-
duction cannot be measured with precision, the FDA’s regulatory over-
sight of vaccines focuses on the production process. Regulators demand
strict compliance with well-defined production processes that are designed
and validated by the manufacturer and approved by FDA. “Generic”
biologics do not exist, because a new product cannot be established as
biologically equivalent to a previously approved product given existing
technology. This “bioequivalence” is something easily established in many
other chemically based pharmaceutical products. Currently, every manu-
facturer must conduct extensive clinical trials to demonstrate that the
product generated by their production process is safe and effective.
To assure the reliability of clinical trial results, FDA requires that the prod-
uct used in Phase III trials are representative of those that will be mar-
keted. Industry has generally found that this requirement necessitates
that the vaccine used in the final stage of Phase II clinical testing be manu-
factured in the facility and with the processes intended for production of
the eventual commercial product.
The FDA requires two separate approvals for the introduction of a bio-
logic: an Establishment License Application (ELA), assuring the facility
and process for manufacturing, and a Product License Application (PLA),
containing data on the safety and efficacy of the product. In contrast, FDA
drug approvals require only one approved application, the New Drug
Application (NDA). Minor modifications in production process of vac-
cines, such as new packaging materials, may require regulatory approval
and re-licensing of the production facility. In order to avoid unnecessary
costs down the road, manufacturers generally build their commercial pro-
duction facilities and seek their ELA before moving on to Phase III trials.
Even after a product has been FDA-approved, extensive quality control
measures are also required to ensure ongoing compliance with specified
production processes and to assure product integrity. In addition to this
self-monitoring, manufacturers must submit samples of each vaccine lot
to the FDA for approval before the lot can be sold. FDA inspectors will
also periodically visit production facilities to verify adherence to regula-
tory guidelines established by current Good Manufacturing Practices.
Many of these process-bound regulatory approaches have the potential
to change in the future as new technologies and techniques allow for im-
proved analytic characterization of biologics. Some smaller biological
molecules can already be defined and their structure and composition
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can be accurately verified. In light of these advances, the European Union
has cleared the way for generic versions of some biologic products. How-
ever, the advent of “end product”–oriented regulation of vaccines is not
likely in the immediate future, as vaccines are very large and complex
molecules that are particularly challenging to characterize.
Patent protections — Intellectual property rights related to vaccine
products, as conferred through patent protections, typically hinge on tech-
nological breakthroughs in the production process, not on the vaccine
product itself. Patents are generally not bestowed on materials found in
nature, fundamentally limiting the patentability of a biological product
like vaccines. To the extent vaccine products enjoy patent protection, they
usually incorporate chemical additives, such as adjuvants or stabilizers,
or are produced with novel techniques, such as genetic engineering.
Even when vaccine patents exist, conventional wisdom holds that pat-
ents for vaccines generally provide less commercial protection and value
for producers than patents for chemical pharmaceuticals. Vaccine pat-
ents do not prohibit the sale of competing products created through alter-
native production processes. By engineering processes similar but not
identical to the protected technology, competitors are able to bring com-
parable vaccines to market.7 The substantial involvement by government
agencies in early vaccine research also has raised questions about the value
of patent positions, as these agencies tend to prefer nonexclusive licenses
to patentable discoveries.
The complexities of vaccine production, coupled with the challenges of
maintaining a scale suitable for producing tens of millions of doses, require
both specialized facilities and highly trained personnel. Only a handful of
organizations have the capital and expertise to meet these requirements.
Consequently, only a small number of companies produce vaccine for the
U.S. market. Although 11 manufacturers now hold vaccine product licenses,
most vaccines are produced by four large pharmaceutical companies: Sanofi
Aventis (formerly Aventis Pasteur), GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, and Wyeth.
Vaccine Production
The production processes for manufacturing vaccines are highly com-
plex, specialized, and time consuming. While the precise production
methods can differ substantially among vaccines, some generalizations
can be made. All vaccine production involves the growth and harvesting
of microorganisms, either the disease-causing organism or another mi-
croorganism that has been modified or genetically engineered to produce
the antigenic characteristics of the disease-causing agent.
Cultivation — Pathogenic organisms that grow remarkably well
within the human body can prove difficult to culture under industrial
manufacturing conditions. Microbial growth can be highly sensitive to
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variations in temperature and to particular types of growth media. For
example, viruses can only be grown in living cells, such as cell cultures
and fertilized hen’s eggs. Small changes in environmental conditions or
in the strain of microorganism used in the production process can sig-
nificantly reduce the yield of biological material available to create the
vaccine product. To further complicate matters, the very conditions that
encourage growth of the target microorganism can often promote growth
of unwanted contaminants, creating the need for powerful air filtration
systems and the use of rigorous sterile techniques.
Purification — After the growth phase, additional steps are taken to iso-
late and, in some cases, inactivate the microorganism being used in vaccine
preparation. In other cases, the microorganism is split into com-
ponent parts and specific molecules with the appropriate anti-
genic qualities are isolated to serve as the basis of the vaccine.
The active component of the vaccine is then isolated and
blended with other materials to produce what is known as the
bulk. It can take anywhere from four to nine months to culti-
vate the microbe and produce the bulk.
Quality control — Because small deviations in process can
have a major impact on the potency and effectiveness of
the vaccine product, stringent quality control procedures are
used to verify that the vaccine product contains the desired
antigenic material in the correct dosage and is free of con-
taminants. Quality control specialists employed by the manu-
facturer measure progress at each step of the production
process through analysis of a variety of biomarkers, includ-
ing protein content, viral infectivity, bacterial contamination,
and endotoxin content.8 Each batch must be tested against
strict standards. Despite rigid compliance with standardized
production protocols, assumptions regarding process integ-
rity and product quality do not carry over from one batch to
another. It can take up to three months to complete all neces-
sary quality control activities.
Packaging — Following these quality control steps, the bulk
is prepared for packaging. This process can involve freeze
drying the product to extend its shelf life. The finished prod-
uct is packaged in appropriate containers for delivery. Ad-
ditional quality control tests are performed at this stage to
ensure that the packaging process has not altered the safety
or potency of the vaccine product and samples from each
batch are sent to regulators for additional testing. Finishing
the product from the bulk, including time for regulatory as-
sessment, can take five to seven months, resulting in a total
production time of 9 to 16 months.
Vaccine Manufacture – Manufacture of
vaccine takes 9 to 16 months. Throughout
the process, quality control measures are
implemented.
Cultivation
Grow in Media
Harvest
Isolate microbe or virus
Quality Control (QC)
Verify vaccine’s antigenic quality
Packaging and Final QC
Transfer vaccine to containers
Send to regulators for approval
Purification
Isolate and/or inactivate antigen
Highlights of the Process
5 to 7
months
4 to 9
months
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THE VACCINE MARKET
Vaccines are a small piece of the global pharmaceutical market, represent-
ing approximately 1.5 percent of all pharmaceutical revenues.9 Worldwide
sales of vaccines are estimated to be between $4.8 and $6 billion per year,
with about a quarter of total sales in the United States ($1.5 billion).10 Pedi-
atric vaccines make up the majority of the U.S. market, accounting for ap-
proximately 70 percent of domestic vaccine sales (see illustration, below).
Although it is small, the vaccine market continues to grow at a modest
but steady rate. The global market for vaccines has grown about 10 per-
cent per year since 1992 due largely to the worldwide effort to eradicate
polio as well as the introduction of new, higher priced pediatric vaccine
products in industrialized countries. For example, the recent introduc-
tion of a childhood pneumococcal vaccine effectively doubled the U.S.
market due to its relatively high price and high uptake rate.
Other vaccine products introduced in the last decade represented improve-
ments to existing vaccines rather than novel disease protection. These new,
higher priced vaccines tended to displace existing products, resulting in
less significant increases in overall sales. For example, when the safer, inac-
tivated poliovirus vaccine was introduced, it rapidly replaced active oral
poliovirus vaccine in clinical practice. The older vaccine was ultimately
withdrawn from the market.
Market analysts anticipate strong vaccine market
growth in the future. One information service that
tracks commercial developments in the vaccine
pipeline listed nearly 200 projects in the Phase II
and Phase III stages of clinical trials in mid-2004.11
Nearly 30 new vaccines are expected to be devel-
oped and marketed by 2010, including those of-
fering protection against human papilloma virus
(HPV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV),
as well as therapeutic vaccines for melanoma and
rheumatoid arthritis.
Despite historic and projected growth in the over-
all vaccine market, policymakers are deeply con-
cerned about the perceived fragility of the nation’s vaccine sup-
ply. These concerns are driven by sporadic—yet not infrequent—
supply shortages for existing vaccines, as well as weak industry
interest in the development and production of vaccines that have
limited commercial appeal. Vaccines with limited market appeal
include products directed against potential bioterrorism threats and
those directed at diseases prevalent mostly or exclusively in developing
countries. While some new vaccine products may be economically appeal-
ing to manufacturers, market forces are neither stimulating increased pro-
duction capacity for existing vaccines nor encouraging the development of
vaccines for diseases not currently prevalent in industrialized countries.
Non-U.S.
U.S.
Pediatric
Adult
Non-Vaccines
U.S
. Market Share
Glo
bal Ph
armaceutical Sales
Vaccines
Worldwide Pharmaceutical Sales
and the U.S. Share of the Vaccine Market
Vaccines represent a very small portion of global phar-
maceutical sales. About one quarter of vaccines are sold
in the United States, where
pediatric vaccine sales
dominate the market.
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Winner(s) Take All
Prevailing market conditions have led to industry consolidations and
product withdrawals, resulting in an overall decrease in the number of
manufacturers engaged in vaccine production as well as a narrowing of
the competitive field for specific product classes (vaccines that target the
same disease agent). Many vaccines are now produced by only one manu-
facturer. Some analysts have concluded that the economic dynamics of
the vaccine market preordain a small number of suppliers for any given
product class. Although this “winner take all” dynamic does not guaran-
tee a single, monopolistic supplier, there appears to be a general tendency
for vaccine markets to drift toward one or few producers for a given prod-
uct class because of the cost structure of vaccine production coupled with
relatively low levels of demand for vaccine products.
Limited market size — Unlike drug or other commercial products, a per-
son will use a vaccine product only a limited number of times in his or
her lifetime. Therefore the potential market for a vaccine product is in-
herently limited by the number of people in the population group tar-
geted by the vaccine. A basic pediatric vaccine will be used between one
and five times, depending on the schedule of inoculation, on a cohort of
about 4 million children born in the United States each year.12 In 2002,
about 140 million units of vaccine were used for children, over one-third
of which was represented by three vaccines: diphtheria, tetanus, and per-
tussis (known as DTaP-containing) combination vaccine (20 million doses);
polio vaccine (19 million); and measles, mumps, and rubella (12 million).
In contrast, prescriptions for a “blockbuster” drug like Lipitor are filled
over 66 million times each year,13 with annual revenues (above $10 bil-
lion) in excess of the total worldwide vaccine industry. The potential to
increase vaccine market size through international sales is limited by both
disparate regulatory requirements across nations and weak purchasing
power in developing countries. Therefore, the potential volume of prod-
uct sales for vaccines is relatively finite and small.
Barriers to entry — Only a handful of suppliers are currently positioned
to play in the vaccine market. High start-up costs and specialized exper-
tise requirements restrict market participation to the limited number of
entities capable of mobilizing both the significant capital and highly skilled
labor necessary for vaccine development and commercial production. The
high start-up costs are related to significant research and development
expenses, as well as the costs associated with the construction of special-
ized vaccine production facilities.
The experience and infrastructure developed to produce one vaccine does
not translate directly into an ability to produce a different vaccine. Existing
manufacturers also face high start-up costs when launching a new vaccine
product. However, manufacturers already participating in some type of
vaccine production are arguably best positioned to compete in additional
segments of the vaccine market. Even a well capitalized newcomer to the
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vaccine industry would face significant competitive disadvantages. Vac-
cine production is highly dependent on skilled labor, and existing firms
already command the human resources with the requisite scientific, tech-
nical, policy, and regulatory expertise.
Competitive pressures — If multiple members of the limited field of
vaccine suppliers elect to produce substitutable vaccine products, price com-
petition among firms with high start-up costs, high fixed costs, and rela-
tively low variable costs will be fierce. Mercer Management Consulting
calculates that only 15 percent of the costs of vaccine production are vari-
able and change directly in relation to the amount of product made. Sixty
percent of vaccine production costs are fixed, meaning they will not change
regardless of how much product is produced. An additional 25 percent of
production costs are semi-variable, meaning they are fixed for each batch
of vaccine produced, no matter how many doses are produced per batch.14
High fixed costs create powerful incentives for manufacturers to achieve
economies of scale by maximizing production capacity. As the volume of
vaccine produced increases, the average cost of producing each dose drops
dramatically. Under these conditions, suppliers will seek to peg produc-
tion capacity to anticipated demand levels and make as much
vaccine as capacity will allow. The supplier will lower
prices aggressively in an effort to increase sales and
capture market share. As the volume of vaccine
produced and sold increases, the “winning”
manufacturer is increasingly able to
undercutcompetitors’ prices, further
reinforcing market dominance.15
Once the market share of a “losing”
supplier falls below the level neces-
sary to sustain the high fixed costs
of continued production, the sup-
plier is likely to exit the market. De-
termining what level of sustenance
is required to support continued pro-
duction is, at least in part, at the discretion
of individual manufacturers and is likely to be a
function of their profit expectations and perceived op-
portunity costs. Some markets may be large enough to support
multiple manufacturers at their full production capacity, so a single “win-
ner” may not emerge. However, if a monopoly does not result, the mar-
ket will likely be dominated by relatively small number of producers.
Capital investment requirements may precipitate market exits. Cost in-
creases related to changing regulatory requirements, such as the removal
of the preservative thimerosol due to safety concerns, or facility mainte-
nance expenditures to ensure compliance with existing standards, can
hasten decisions to withdraw from the market. Faced with making a
High fixed costs lead to intense
price competition. Manufactur-
ers seek to maximize production
capacity and are will ing to
lower prices in order to capture
market share.
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significant financial investment to stay in a losing game, a manufacturer in
a relatively weak market position is likely to stop production.
In the absence of patent protections, the emergence of one or few dominant
suppliers occurs less frequently in pharmaceutical markets. Pharmaceuti-
cal markets are generally larger than vaccine markets relative to the fixed
costs of production. Demand levels are typically robust enough to allow
several suppliers to co-exist, each capturing the volume of sales necessary
to sustain production costs.
The financial hit taken by the “losing” player in a vaccine market is quite
substantial. Retooling vaccine production facilities to manufacture a differ-
ent vaccine is very difficult and costly, and the knowledge gained through
research and development efforts has limited application to other prod-
ucts. Therefore, the significant financial resources invested in start-up are
largely sunk costs. They can not be recouped through alternative business
opportunities. This makes the “winner(s) take all” vaccine market a very
risky venture for would-be manufacturers.
Price sensitivity — Competitor withdrawal from vaccine markets makes
the position of the “winning” firm or firms more attractive from a pricing
perspective, but prices generally do not spiral upward even if a monopoly
position is secured. The reasons for this relative stability in prices stems
from the nature of demand for vaccine products. The demand factors sup-
pressing price differ somewhat for pediatric versus adult vaccines.
Demand for childhood vaccines tends to be highly concentrated, with fed-
eral and state governments purchasing approximately 60 percent of all
pediatric vaccines sold in the United States.16 The purchasing power and
political clout of the government has historically put downward pressure
on vaccine prices. Some of this pressure has taken the form of direct, legis-
latively imposed price caps. However, even when explicit price controls
are not in place, government purchasers have been viewed historically as
inflexible customers who will demand low prices. Recent events suggest
that this view may be changing (see “A Government Success Story?”  on
page 26) and is leading to departures from the typical market dynamic.
The purchase of adult vaccines tends to be less concentrated and less con-
trolled by government purchasers, but demand for these products is less
predictable and generally weaker relative to pediatric vaccines. Insurance
coverage for adult vaccines is less common than coverage for childhood
vaccines, meaning that patients are more likely to pay out of pocket for
these products. Vaccines are given to healthy people, who may not fully
appreciate the need for disease protection. Because the perceived need for
the vaccine product is low, patients tend to be very price sensitive. Even
when fully covered by insurance, uptake rates for adult vaccines are low,
suggesting, at least in part, weak consumer demand for these products.
Adults appear more willing to risk their own vulnerability to infectious
disease than to gamble on that of their children.
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Physicians and other health care providers play a very important role
in mediating the demand for vaccine products. Consumers are more
likely to receive a vaccine if their provider offers and recommends it.
Provider payment incentives could significantly influence providers’ will-
ingness to offer vaccination services. A recent survey of obstetrician-
gynecologists found that although the majority recommended influenza
vaccine for pregnant women, less than 40 percent of those that recom-
mended vaccination actually provided the vaccine through their prac-
tice.17 Concerns related to reimbursement and liability were cited as the
main reasons for not administering the vaccination.
Whether driven by patient, provider, or purchaser concerns, demand for
vaccines is considered highly price sensitive. Relatively low vaccine prices
for both childhood and adult vaccines provide little incentive for new sup-
pliers to enter the market with similar “me too” products. An alternative
manufacturer might consider launching a substitute product if that prod-
uct was clearly superior in terms of safety, effectiveness, or convenience
and if it promised to completely displace the existing product. This would
allow the new entrant to “steal” the existing manufacturers’ market share
and become the new dominant supplier.
This dynamic of displacement by a superior product has played out on
multiple occasions with pediatric vaccines. Many of the new formula-
tions are broader combinations of multiple vaccines, which offer conve-
nience to parents, children, and practitioners by reducing the number of
separate inoculations required. Due in part to the market influence of
recommendations issued by professional societies (such as the American
Academy of Pediatrics) and the CDC-sponsored Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), new combination vaccines have quickly
supplanted existing products in most corresponding vaccine product
classes. The withdrawal of competitors’ products diminishes the com-
petitiveness of the market. This trend may have reached its limits, how-
ever, due to a variety of factors, including decreased provider revenue
associated with combination vaccines.
Inventory control — Once established, a dominant vaccine supplier has
little incentive to maintain excess production capacity or produce surplus
vaccine. The high fixed costs associated with producing each batch of vac-
cine combined with the perishable nature of the product encourage manu-
facturers to closely match production volume with anticipated demand.
Manufacturers are likely to be conservative in estimating market demand
and, by extension, in determining production capacity because unsold in-
ventory can significantly detract from already low profit margins.
Furthermore, because production capacity is difficult to scale incremen-
tally, manufacturers must decide how much capacity to build long before
the product is even marketed, often before Phase III trials are begun. This
puts enormous pressure on manufacturers to correctly estimate demand
levels. Too low an estimate will not allow the manufacturer enough
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latitude to secure adequate market share, compromising its ability to win
in the price competition. Too high an estimate will inflate their cost base
and erode profit margins.
This tightly orchestrated match between demand and supply can lead to
vaccine shortages when demand unexpectedly exceeds planned produc-
tion levels, or when problems encountered in the manufacturing process
diminish vaccine yield. The cost structure of vaccine production favors
concentration in terms of numbers of participating manufacturers, num-
bers of production facilities operated by those manufacturers, and the
numbers of batches run to produce the vaccine product. A single glitch in
production can have a huge effect on the total available supply.
Given the complexity and unpredictability of the vaccine production pro-
cesses, it is difficult to prevent such problems entirely; periodic vaccine
shortages are inevitable. The influenza vaccine is particularly vulnerable
to supply interruptions. Because the vaccine must be reformulated annu-
ally, the production process is less predictable than that for other vac-
cines, and reserves or stockpiles cannot be established to ease shortages
when they occur.
Neither can production capacity be easily altered to accommodate unan-
ticipated increases in demand or to compensate for low yields experienced
in prior production cycles. The long time frames inherent in vaccine pro-
duction, the capital-dependent nature of the production process, and the
resources needed to meet regulatory requirements make vaccine produc-
tion capacity and, consequently, supply inflexible in the short term.
Bigger Fish to Fry
Entering into vaccine markets can be an unappealing business proposi-
tion for reasons beyond the “winner(s) take all” dynamic described above.
While the interplay between supply costs, market size, and consumer
price sensitivity clarify why established vaccine markets are typically
served by one or few suppliers, they do not fully account for limited in-
dustry interest in developing novel vaccines. Why aren’t manufacturers
more eager to develop new vaccines with the hopes of cornering the mar-
ket on these products?
The reasons that vaccine development is often seen as a poor business
investment relate in large part to how vaccines compare to pharmaceu-
tical products. Because the major vaccine manufacturers in the United
States also produce pharmaceutical products, proposals to invest in new
vaccine products often compete with drug development initiatives that
appear much more lucrative. In comparison to these potentially high
yielding investments, vaccine development does not appear to be an
attractive option.
Although investment decisions in the pharmaceutical field are highly com-
plex, such decisions hinge on three key issues: (i) achieving profit margins
Vaccine investments
compete with drug
development efforts
that can appear more
lucrative.
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in accordance with the external expectations of the financial/investment
community, (ii) the ability to generate significant revenue (in other words,
finding a market that supports sales through high prices, high volume, or
both), and (iii) identifying markets with growth potential.
Profitability — Outside expectations factor significantly in the involve-
ment of publicly owned drug companies in the vaccine market. Pharma-
ceutical companies are obligated to seek high rates of return to satisfy the
expectations of their investors. Investments in ancillary businesses such
as vaccines can be profitable, but if they do not match the high returns
and high growth expectations of major pharmaceutical products, they
will be viewed as a drag on a company’s overall profitability.
Financial markets expect that publicly owned pharmaceutical firms will
only invest in high growth and high profit margin areas. The chair of
Wharton’s Health Care Systems Department, Mark Pauley, noted that
“the rules of thumb” for allocating investments within drug companies
“favor the more profitable silos.” Benchmarked against drugs, Pauley said,
vaccines in general look like low-margin products.18
Two other recognized economists in the pharmaceutical field, Henry
Grabowski and John Vernon from Duke, have argued that returns on in-
vestment in vaccines have historically lagged behind pharmaceuticals
because of the large capital investment required for vaccines.19 In calcu-
lating return on investment, a product’s profitability is considered within
the context of the time spent in achieving those returns. Because capital
costs are so high and must be accrued so long before revenues are gener-
ated, vaccines compare unfavorably relative to pharmaceuticals when
considered from the longer term perspective of return on investment.
Size matters — The limited market potential for vaccine products, as
measured by total revenue, is a key reason why pharmaceutical develop-
ment proposals are often seen as more appealing relative to vaccines. This
market limitation is driven by both volume and price considerations. Two
economists recently analyzing the underlying incentives for the develop-
ment of drug treatments versus vaccines find that drugs appear to be
more efficient revenue producers than vaccines.
The economists Michael Kremer of Harvard University and Christopher
Snyder of George Washington University developed models and equa-
tions to elaborate on the common and intuitive view “that firms prefer
treatments to vaccines since a vaccine often cures after a single dose, only
allowing one chance to extract revenue from a consumer.”20
Kremer and Snyder show that the effect of treating patients after they
have contracted a disease changes the value of the product to patients
and increases the amount that can be charged per dose compared to vac-
cines. Because preventative vaccines are used broadly among the popu-
lation to protect people who will not be exposed to a disease as well as
those who are likely to be exposed, there is an innate pressure to hold
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down the per-dose price. People who are at low risk, or perceive them-
selves to be at low risk, of contracting the disease are not likely to value
the protection highly.
Treatment products “extract revenue” from a large population “more ef-
fectively than vaccines,” according to Kremer and Snyder. “Since vac-
cines are administered before consumers contract the disease, there is no
basis on which the firm can discriminate among” people at different lev-
els of risk and no way for the firm to determine which consumers would
be more likely to pay a high price for a product. Kremer and Snyder note
that drug treatments are given to consumers after they have contracted a
disease and thus the value individuals place on the product is clearer.
The economists also note that vaccines can affect long-term commercial
return calculations by preventing the transmission of infectious disease.
“Drug treatments allow the firm to extract rent from the whole stream of
future generations; vaccines end up reducing the prevalence of the dis-
ease among future generations, in the extreme eradicating the disease
from the population.” The combination of these factors make the poten-
tial revenues of drugs much greater than vaccines.
Growth potential — The very stability of some vaccine markets makes
them unattractive to some drug companies. Historically, a prime example
has been the pediatric vaccine market. The annual birth cohort in the United
States has remained relatively stable for nearly a decade. Vaccination rates
are approaching a saturation point (that is, approaching the positive target
of nearly full vaccination of all preschool-age children for several diseases).
Companies producing preschool vaccines face the prospect of manufactur-
ing the same number of shots or vaccination doses year after year without
new growth prospects. Although such a stable market may appear initially
attractive, it causes problems in an industry segment that is constantly on
the search for growth areas. Some manufacturers have recently begun to
pursue new markets to make childhood vaccines more attractive by pre-
paring versions of the product targeting older populations (such as devel-
oping a varicella vaccine that targets shingles as well as chickenpox) or
adding “booster” dosages targeted toward adolescents.
During the recent debate over the level of incentives necessary to attract
manufacturers to bioterrorism countermeasures, one vaccine company ex-
ecutive explained the pharmaceutical industry’s preference for long-term
growth markets. At an October 27, 2004, NIH-sponsored meeting, Wyeth
Executive Vice President George Siber indicated that vaccine stockpiles
(even large ones for 200 to 300 million doses for bioterrorism vaccines) were
not an attractive commercial proposition for major companies. Investors
“want to see growth in the companies [they] invest in and a bioterrorism
vaccine released to stockpile followed by a rotation of the stockpile is not a
growth proposition.” Because of the one-time nature of the government’s
need in this field, the Wyeth executive stated “I don’t believe we will see
large industrial firms flocking to make bioterrorism vaccines.”21
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These growth expectations are linked to the way stockholders value firms,
influencing the price at which shares in these firms are traded. In pub-
licly traded companies with many shareholders, stock price, rather than
profitability, dictates the value of the firm. Although profit margins influ-
ence stock price, a growing firm will be more highly valued than an equally
profitable firm whose growth appears to be stagnant.
Liability: The Straw That Broke the Camel’s Back?
Liability concerns further compromise the business appeal of vaccine
production. In addition to the unforgiving nature of the market and the
unfavorable financial prospects relative to pharmaceuticals, potential
vaccine manufacturers also face the specter of crippling financial payouts
related to product liability cases. Despite the cautious risk thresholds
used by regulators in approving vaccine products, these products are
particularly vulnerable to product liability suits because they are given
to healthy people.
Even in cases where the link between a vaccine and adverse health events
has not been scientifically established, litigation expenses, negotiated
settlements, and liability insurance can significantly add to manufac-
turers’ production costs. In the late 1980s, lawsuits totaling more than
$21 million were filed after a British researcher published a
paper suggesting that the pertussis vaccine caused brain
damage in some children. Although this finding did not hold
up to scientific inquiry, the costs of defending against li-
ability suits combined with some significant settlements con-
tributed to manufacturers exiting the market and increased
product costs.22
The magnitude of liability-related costs cannot be quantified precisely.
Some skeptics question the degree to which liability concerns truly influ-
ence manufacturers’ decisions to enter or remain in vaccine markets given
the liability protections now provided under federal law. The National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), instituted in 1986, was
created to provide an alternative compensation system for individuals
injured from receiving a recommended childhood vaccine. Funded
through an excise tax on each dose of covered vaccine sold, the VICP has
streamlined compensation for persons experiencing adverse events known
to be associated with vaccines and has established a scientifically rigor-
ous forum for considering injury causation.
Although it has reduced manufacturers’ liability burden, the VICP does
not fully resolve liability concerns.23 Claimants can reject VICP decisions
and pursue subsequent legal action through the courts, and acceptance
of a VICP award may not preclude claimants from seeking compensation
for pain and suffering through the tort system. In addition, VICP does
not provide liability protection for all vaccines licensed for sale in the
Some question the degree to
which liability concerns influence
manufacturers’ decisions to enter
or exit the market.
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United States. The VICP program is generally limited to vaccines rou-
tinely given to children, although some vaccines included in the program
are also marketed to adults, such as the influenza vaccine.
Liability concerns reportedly played a role in GlaxoSmithKline’s decision
to withdraw the Lyme disease vaccine from the market.24 This product was
not covered by VICP, and the manufacturer spent millions of dollars de-
fending its product against claims that the vaccine caused chronic arthritis,
muscle pain, and other chronic conditions, despite the lack of sound evi-
dence to prove these assertions. These liability concerns, combined with
limited market potential, led to the product’s complete withdrawal.
POLICY INTERVENTIONS
The economic dynamics of vaccine markets and the financial calculus of
vaccine manufacturers are both efficient and rational, but the existing
vaccine enterprise fails to meet a range of public health objectives.
Vaccine shortages threaten the health of children and adults, cause sig-
nificant disruption to the operations of health care providers, and under-
mine public confidence in the benefits of vaccines. Vaccine products that
could offer important disease protection to targeted populations have been
withdrawn from the market and are no longer available. Inadequate in-
vestment in research and development has likely delayed the availability
of new vaccines that could prevent death and disability.
Policy proposals to stimulate the vaccine market to correct these prob-
lems can be divided into “push” and “pull” strategies. Push strategies
seek to address the supply-side issues that vex the market by lightening
the burden of production costs. Pull strategies strive to improve demand-
side conditions by “sweetening the pot” through increased demand vol-
ume or enhanced product prices.
Push Proposals
Push mechanisms have been viewed as relatively weak drivers of the
vaccine market.25 However, it is unclear whether this finding reflects in-
adequate investment in push policies or an inherent failing of supply-
side interventions in the vaccine context. These types of policies do
require the government to intervene more directly in developing vaccine
candidates and supporting manufacturer production efforts. Push strate-
gies typically require financial investment early in product development
without any guarantee that a useable vaccine will result, shifting risk
from the private sector to the public sector. These issues may reduce
policymakers’ enthusiasm for push proposals.
From the manufacturers’ perspective, push strategies improve the finan-
cial prospects of vaccine development and production but do little to
guarantee the sales volume or purchase price that dictate profitability,
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revenues, and growth potential. Despite these drawbacks, a number of
push proposals have been pursued or proposed to enhance the stability
of the vaccine market.
Research and development subsidies — Public funding of vaccine dis-
covery and early development efforts can significantly reduce manu-
facturers’ upfront financial outlays and favorably alter return on invest-
ment calculations. The NIH sponsors approximately one-third of all
vaccine-related research.26 The mechanisms used to distribute these NIH
funds vary widely. In some cases funding is directed toward specific
manufacturers who typically secure the funds through competitive ap-
plications. In other cases the research and development work is con-
ducted by academic institutions and supported through government
grants. Some research is done directly by government agencies or se-
cured through contractual mechanisms. The results of such government-
funded research are generally in the public domain for private sector
entities to capitalize on as they see fit. Other models offer tax credits to
companies that engage in specific types of research.
The first BioShield Act of 2004 conferred more authority and lead-
ership in the vaccine development effort on the National Insti-
tutes of Allergy and Infections Diseases (NIAID). The law increased
the federal share of bioterrorism projects handled by NIAID and
allowed the institute to confer grants to modernize biomedical
capacity. NIAID has moved to the forefront of the federal government’s
research and development efforts in the vaccine area. NIAID has the fast-
est growing budget among the NIH institutes. NIAID has taken the lead
in the direction of vaccine research on HIV and is involved in the plan-
ning for pandemic vaccines. The institute is on track to spend nearly one-
quarter of its total budget on vaccine development: $1.4 billion out of a
total of $4.5 billion.27
Among the range of vaccine projects in the NIAID purview are projects
on the next generation anthrax vaccine (called rPA), testing on several
new smallpox vaccines to lessen the side effects of those vaccinations, a
human trial on an Ebola virus vaccine, continued work on AIDS vaccines,
and numerous flu vaccine projects.28 At the end of March 2005, NIAID
selected three sites to enroll 450 healthy volunteers for a Phase I (safety)
trial of Sanofi Pasteur’s H5N1 avian flu vaccine.
Federally sponsored research and development has generally focused on
basic research and vaccine discovery, but in some cases has extended to
larger, clinical trials of vaccine candidates. NIAID recently completed
construction of a Vaccine Pilot Plant in Fredrick, Maryland, that will manu-
facture selected candidate vaccines for the early phases of clinical trials.
Some observers have argued that NIAID should focus less on the devel-
opment of specific vaccines and more on finding solutions to the regula-
tory challenges that hinder vaccine production. For example, the lack of
NIAID spends nearly one-
quarter of its total budget on
vaccine development.
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analytic technologies to characterize the end product of vaccine produc-
tion necessitates costly, cumbersome, process-intensive quality assurance
activities. The development of advanced analytic techniques for vaccine
characterization and potency determination could significantly stream-
line vaccine approval and production.29
Senate bill 1873, introduced in the 109th Congress, would create the es-
tablishment of a Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Agency
(BARDA) to coordinate and support the development of biodefense and
pandemic influenza countermeasures, including vaccines. Some believe
that the creation of such a dedicated agency is needed to mediate priori-
ties across agencies in the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), as well as to create an infrastructure for more directed funding
of biodefense countermeasure priorities. Concerns have been raised that
NIH’s traditional grant-funding mechanisms do not provide the frame-
work needed for a “hands-on” government role in moving relevant re-
search and development forward. Others have questioned the Freedom
of Information Act exemptions that S.1873 would extend to BARDA and
worry that such exemptions could hinder the open access to information
that promotes good science.
Regulatory clarification and harmonization — In some ways the im-
pact of governmental support for research and development is counter-
balanced by stringent FDA regulatory requirements regarding product
approval and manufacturing practices. The requirements promulgated
by FDA have often been by cited by industry representatives as a signifi-
cant, and correctable, cost driver for vaccine production. Though the need
for strict regulatory oversight is widely acknowledged, some observers
have noted that more transparent, consistent implementation of regula-
tory authority could decrease production costs. Proposals to allow accel-
erated approval for products with high societal benefits have also been
made. Such proposals would allow deemed products to utilize surrogate
endpoints, such as antibody levels, in the place of clinical outcomes to
demonstrate product efficacy.30 Regulatory reform has also been proposed
to reduce discrepancies between FDA requirements and those of foreign
regulators. For example, the FDA does not allow the transfer of results
from clinical trials conducted overseas to the United States if the trials
have not been monitored by FDA. In contrast, FDA-monitored trials are
transferable to most European countries. Improved regulatory harmoni-
zation could facilitate global distribution of a given product, allowing
the high fixed costs of vaccine development to be spread most widely.
Production subsidies — Government funding to support production costs
is less common than subsidization of vaccine discovery and development.
However, several proposals have been suggested to create incentives for
ongoing participation in vaccine markets. Some of these proposed pro-
duction subsidies are specifically targeted at encouraging manufacturers
to invest in excess or idle capacity that could be leveraged in emergency
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situations when supply shortages occur. Other proposals are focused on
stimulating investment in new production technologies. For example, one
suggestion discussed in vaccine policy meetings and on Capitol Hill calls
for tax incentives such as accelerated depreciation for upgrade invest-
ments. Tax incentives have been incorporated into two recent bills de-
signed to stimulate development of biodefense products.31
Upgrade incentives could make corporate decisions to con-
tinue funding improvements easier, but for suppliers with
overseas production facilities, such incentives may not have
any value. Specifically, tax incentives for upgrades are not
likely to have affected the 2004 flu vaccine shortage situa-
tion. Chiron’s loss of about 50 million units of flu vaccine stemmed from
quality problems at a vaccine production facility located in Liverpool,
UK. Whether U.S. tax credits would have extended to foreign sources of
supply is questionable. Even without specific tax credit incentives, Chiron
invested more than $70 million from 1999 to 2004 in the bulk ingredient
and filling operations at Liverpool and was planning an additional $100
million investment in increased capacity and quality controls.32
Government production — At the extreme of production subsidies is
fully funded government production of a vaccine. Under this model, the
full cost of vaccine production would be sponsored with public funds
either in a government-owned and -operated facility (sometimes referred
to as GoGo) or in a government-owned facility with a private entity man-
aging operations through a contractual agreement (sometimes referred
to as GoCo). This strategy has typically been proposed for vaccines that
have very limited market appeal. However, full government sponsorship
of vaccine production, even for a narrow subset of vaccines, has histori-
cally had limited political support. This reluctance stems from concerns
related to the government’s ability to operate efficiently and innovate,
along with a general aversion to assuming functions that could be car-
ried out by the private sector. Michigan and Massachusetts have spon-
sored vaccine production for DTP and Td (tetanus and diphtheria). These
government-owned manufacturers struggled to meet the development
costs for new products; Michigan eliminated and Massachusetts scaled
back vaccine production activities.
Liability protections — There are three basic models of liability protec-
tion that appear relevant to the vaccine discussion. Compensation pro-
grams established for required general use vaccines, such as the VICP,
offer one approach. A compensation plan essentially deflects litigation
from the courts; it requires a specific set-aside of funds to pay claims
that are adjudicated through administrative mechanisms. Such programs
do not necessarily shelter manufacturers from suits; the tort system re-
mains a fallback option for claimants. Compensation programs can lessen
the cost burden of litigation by weeding out the majority of cases, can
spread award-related costs across time, and may shift some liability to
Full government sponsorship of
vaccine production has had limited
political support.
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purchasers through an excise tax mechanism. Such programs may also
impose more rigorous scientific scrutiny in settling claims, which may
influence award levels. Even if the claimant pursues subsequent legal
action, the scientific evidence compiled through the administrative pro-
cess can be brought to bear in tort proceedings.
Tort reform approaches have also been used to protect manufacturers
of products that are required for general use by the population or a seg-
ment of the population. These policy proposals seek to indemnify the
manufacturer against liability risk, but typically include exceptions for
cases of willful misconduct. This form of tort reform was embodied in
the Swine Flu program in 1976, was applied to smallpox countermea-
sures under Section 304 of the 2002 Homeland Security Act (P.L 107-
296), and more recently was extended to pandemic influenza vaccines
and countermeasures in fiscal year 2006 DoD appropriations. These types
of liability protections effectively transfer liability from vaccine manu-
facturers and administrators to the federal government.33
A related form of liability protection also embodied in the Homeland Se-
curity Act is a government contractor’s defense under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. This approach appears in Section 863 of the Homeland Secu-
rity Act to cover antiterror technologies used in response to an attack.
Statutory language can extend Federal Tort Claims Act protections to pri-
vate sector individuals or organizations acting on behalf of the govern-
ment. Because vaccines are often used as a prophylactic, this provision of
the Homeland Security Act may require revision to be appropriate for
bioterrorism preparedness vaccines.
Pull Proposals
Pull strategies are perhaps more common than push strategies, but they
too are not without controversy. Pull proposals are inherently an attempt
to manipulate demand. In theory, government intervention serves to aug-
ment demand, creating a more attractive market for potential investors.
Government subsidies for vaccine purchases are perhaps the most com-
mon, and the most hotly debated, type of pull mechanism.
Government purchase of vaccine products as attempts to enhance the
market appeal of vaccines can be a double-edged sword. Government
purchase commitments can significantly increase the level and predict-
ability of demand for a vaccine product. But many observers believe that
these increases in sales volume are undercut by the lower prices demanded
by government purchasers. The recent product launches in the childhood
vaccine market suggest, however, that under certain conditions, the power
of government purchasers to negotiate price can be limited enough to
provide a net market incentive, as with the Vaccines for Children Pro-
gram (VFC) (see sidebar, next page). Absent explicit, statutory price caps,
government purchase may serve as a positive stimulus to vaccine devel-
opment and production.
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Because of concerns regarding pricing distortions, new proposals to ex-
pand government purchase commitments have generally been designed
as supplements to the private vaccine market. Where significant commer-
cial markets exist, alternative pull proposals that boost demand levels, while
leaving price negotiations to decentralized private purchasers, may be more
appealing to manufacturers. The following reviews some of the pull strat-
egies currently used, or proposed, to improve vaccine market dynamics.
Stockpiles — Stockpiles are, put simply, an artificial enhancement to cur-
rent market demand levels in anticipation of periods when supply will
be insufficient to meet demand. For example, stockpiles of smallpox vac-
cine provide a safeguard should smallpox be used as a bioterrorism agent.
Such forward-thinking planning is driven by concerns related to the like-
lihood of future disruptions in vaccine production or expectations that
the threat of a given infectious disease will increase significantly at some
point in the future. Government funding of vendor-managed stockpiles
of childhood vaccines ensure that some excess vaccine supply is always
available to buffer supply problems when they occur.
The volume and pricing of stockpile purchases differ significantly for
products that are presently sold in private markets compared to products
that have no current commercial value (that is, where the government
Major new vaccines are entering the market as sig-
nificant commercial and public health successes.
Prevnar, Wyeth’s childhood pneumococcal conjugate
vaccine, is a particularly eye-catching example. Ap-
proximately 65 million units of the product were
distributed in the first four and one-half years of use
in the United States. Rates for Prevnar vaccination*
reached 68.1 percent in 2003, the product’s third year
of availability in the U.S. market.†
This fast uptake for a product with the relatively
limited target population—children under 4 years of
age—was achieved despite almost three years of
supply shortages and a steep introductory price of
$58.00 per unit at full list price. The shortage periods
(August 2001 to  May 2003 and February to August
2004), in fact, were probably caused in part by stresses
experienced by Wyeth while trying to keep up with
higher-than-anticipated demand. The high price
associated with the pneumococcal conjugate vaccine
has attracted the attention of competitors as well.
A Government Success Story?
Success Story / continued  ➤
* For three of the recommended four shots.
† “Prevnar - first blockbuster vaccine of the millennium,”
Phacilitate; accessed September 2004 at www.phacilitate.co.uk/
pages/phaciliate/article_prevnar_reilly.html.
‡ GlaxoSmithKline, “GlaxoSmithKline reviews pipeline of novel
vaccines with the potential to dramatically improve global
health,” press release, June 30, 2005; available at www.gsk.com/
ControllerServlet?appId=4&pageId=402&newsid=601.
GlaxoSmithKline has indicated that it plans to launch
an pneumoccocal vaccine within the next five years,‡
a dramatic departure from the traditional vaccine
market dynamic.
Vaccinating young children with Prevnar is creating
rapid spillover benefits to other segments of the
population. Within three years of introduction, studies
appeared indicating a “herd immunity” benefit from
the pediatric use of Prevnar. “Herd immunity” is the
phrase used by public health officials and the vaccine
community to describe the protection provided to
Continued, page 28 ➤
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companies to launch new pediatric products appears
to be a clear sign that the incentive of a broad,
subsidized market in pediatric vaccines is working.
That success comes with one important proviso: the
companies are expending the most effort on products
for which they do not face price restrictions. The VFC
program is unusual in that a scientific advisory
committee, the Centers for Disease Control’s
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
(ACIP), makes a recommendation that leads directly
to coverage for the vaccine as a benefit entitlement.††
Cost considerations are secondary to health benefits
in the ACIP’s process. ACIP recommendations
effectively create a “must-buy” position for VFC
purchasers, constraining their negotiating power.
It is not clear whether this combination of a public
health review and near automatic government
payment can be sustainable for a long period of
time or transferable to other vaccine markets. In
addition to adding to federal budgetary pressures,
the ability of vaccine firms to price aggressively
for new pediatric products also puts pressure on
nonfederal purchasers, including state purchasers
and private practitioners. In 2003, the per-dose cost
of Prevnar for the private pay market was $58.75,
with the federal government negotiating a
preferential price of $45.99.
The twin incentives of the VFC market enhancement
and the protections from the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program have acted to make
large segments of a community by the immunization
of parts of the population.
Although the public health benefits of Prevnar are
now clear, the product’s price nearly doubled the
cost of vaccinating a child in the United States. The
rapid uptake of the product, despite the relatively
high price, can be traced in part to the Vaccine for
Children Program. VFC was not conceived as a
stimulus to the industry; it was designed to help
pay for vaccinations (for the product itself and for
the delivery of vaccine) to disadvantaged children.
In fact, the VFC program was not warmly received
by the vaccine industry when it was debated on
Capitol Hill.
The industry was concerned that the program would
consolidate too much of the market under the federal
government and would lead to stultifying price
controls. As part of the eventual political compromise
that won enactment, VFC vaccines were limited to
uninsured children, children on Medicaid, American
Indians/Alaska Natives, and underinsured children
who would receive vaccinations at federally qualified
health centers.§ Price controls established at the
program’s inception did not apply to new vaccines
developed after enactment.
The impact of VFC on the purchase of childhood
vaccines has been significant. Since the VFC
program’s inception in 1994, the share of
government (federal, state, and local) purchase of
childhood vaccines has risen from 35 percent of all
purchases to 57 percent. In 2002, VFC purchases
alone accounted for 41 percent of childhood vaccine
purchases. The other 16 percent of purchases
controlled by the government comes from grants
from Section 317 of the Public Health Service Act
(11 percent) and state and local programs (5 percent).
The size of VFC vaccine expenditures has increased
sharply from $500,000 in 1994, the first year, to $1.2
billion in fiscal 2004.**
Prevnar is just one example in a growing list of new
vaccines targeting the pediatric market. The
continued effort and interest by major vaccine
Success Story / continued
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§ Institute of Medicine, Financing Vaccines in the 21st Century, 82.
¶ A.  R. Hinman, W.  A. Orenstein, and L. Rodewald, “Financing
Immunization in the United States,” Clinical Infectious Diseases,
(May 15, 2004): 1440–1446.
** Linda Demkovich, “Vaccines for Children: Investment in Immuniza-
tions Yields Big Dividends,” National Conference of State Legisla-
tures, 2005, available at www.ncsl.org/programs/health/vaccines.htm;
Stephen Cochi, “National Immunization Program Report,”
presentation to Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, February 25, 2004, available at
www.cdc.gov/nip/ACIP/minutes/acip-min-feb04.pdf.
†† Hinman, Orenstein, and Rodewald, “Financing Immunization,” 1442.
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represents the only buyer for the product). In the former case, such stock-
piles are clearly a tool used to smooth temporary misalignment between
supply and demand). The stockpile can be relatively small and pricing
marginal. Stock can be rotated into circulation as expiration dates near. In
cases where the product has no commercial value, stockpiles must be
large enough to fully support future demand expectation, prices must be
attractive enough to encourage vaccine production independent of other
buyers, and the costs of stockpile replenishment cannot be offset by the
sale of rotated product.
Advance purchase agreements — Government guarantees to purchase
a specified volume of vaccine at a specified price can encourage manu-
facturers to expand production capacity or stimulate investment in new
Success Story / continued
childhood vaccines very
attractive to vaccine com-
panies. Manufacturers are
pursuing products for
diseases with relatively low
prevalence levels and are still
securing relatively high
prices for the new products.
In the vaccine field, one
measure of value assessment
is the benefit-cost ratio. A high ratio indicates a high
benefit in reduced disease for a relatively low cost.
Inversely, a low benefit-cost ratio indicates that it
takes higher expenditures on a vaccine to generate
the benefits.
One assessment of pediatric vaccines in 2001
indicated that ratios for three new vaccines were
well below older ones. Three recent benefit-cost
calculations for varicella vaccine estimate a benefit-
cost ratio of approximately 5:1; Hepatitis A has a
benefit-cost ratio of 2:1; and two calculations for
pneumococcal conjugate show ratios near 1:1. By
comparison, a separate  benefit-cost analysis of the
older MMR vaccine come in at over 23:1. The
evolution of vaccine development from diseases
with historically high prevalence to diseases with
lower rates of occurrence or less severity is a point
of concern to some public health officials. The new
vaccines are expensive and add substantially to the
overall cost of the standard
schedule of vaccinations
while arguably conferring
fewer benefits (see chart).
At a National Vaccine Advi-
sory Committee meeting in
June 2004, a spokesman for
the Institute of Medicine’s
Committee on Evaluation
of Vaccine Purchase Financing in the United States
noted that there are growing concerns about the
long-term budget effect of broad government
coverage and recommendations for use of new
pediatric vaccines without a careful, systematic
review of product cost. Mark Pauly, a committee
member from the Wharton health systems faculty,
noted that “economists worry about unchecked
behavior, of a recommendation for a relatively small
benefit if someone else is paying the cost.”‡‡ To
address that fundamental concern, the IoM
committee in its 2003 report “Financing Vaccines in
the 21st Century” urged the government’s decision-
making body for recommending vaccine use (currently
ACIP) to “consider both benefits and costs” when
making general use recommendations. ■
‡‡ Mark Pauly, presentation to a meeting co-sponsored by the
National Vaccine Program Office and the National Vaccine
Advisory Committee, Washington, DC, June 28–29, 2004.
Benefit-Cost
Vaccine Ratio
Measles/Mumps/Rubella 23:1
Varicella 5:1
Hepatitis A 2:1
Pneumococcal conjugate 1:1
➤  Continued from page 26
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vaccine development. Again, such agreements are most attractive to in-
dustry if they do not erode or jeopardize sales in the more lucrative
private market. Government guarantees to purchase unused influenza
vaccine inventory have encouraged manufacturers to ramp up produc-
tion capacity, despite yearly fluctuations in consumer demand. Simi-
larly, advance purchase agreements have been proposed to encourage
development of vaccines directed against diseases that are prevalent
primarily in developing countries. Public and philanthropic commit-
ments to purchase these vaccines assure the manufacturer of a paying
buyer. Absent these commitments, the need for the product would still
exist but the economically supported demand would not.
Coverage through public insurance programs — Coverage of vaccine
products through public insurance programs clearly increases the demand
for these products. While childhood vaccines are both covered and pur-
chased centrally for Medicaid through the Vaccines for Children program,
coverage decisions related to adult vaccines are left to the discretion of
individual states, which can negotiate purchase prices.
In contrast, purchase prices for Medicare-covered vaccines are
negotiated by health care providers in a decentralized fashion
(although coverage decisions are made at the national level
through legislative action). The Government Accountability Of-
fice has estimated that as much as 85 percent of annual purchases
of influenza vaccine occur in the private sector.34 Although government
involvement in vaccine purchase (either directly or indirectly) may influ-
ence prices, coverage through public insurance programs clearly increases
demand levels and can make vaccine markets more appealing.
The National Vaccine Advisory Committee has called for broader public
sponsorship of vaccines for uninsured adults in response to the Institute
of Medicine’s (IOM’s) 2003 review of vaccine financing. In a summary of
key recommendations for vaccine funding issued by NVAC in early Oc-
tober 2004, an NVAC workgroup urged “expanded discussion about need,
desirability, and feasibility” of a Vaccines for Adults program “to ensure
that adults have access to vaccines, regardless of whether they have in-
surance.”35 This proposal would represent a major expansion of health
entitlement benefits and could be extended to the large, undervaccinated
population between 19 and 65 years of age. Such an expansion could cre-
ate a market stimulus parallel to that demonstrated by the VFC program.
Universal coverage through federal purchase — Public funding of vac-
cines could be extended beyond existing public insurance programs (or
even beyond the incremental addition of more people to these programs
through new eligibility criteria), to include the entire U.S. population.
Such a strategy would likely be very controversial for vaccines currently
sold in private markets, in light of the potential impact such consolida-
tion of purchasing power might have on product pricing. However,
in circumstances where private markets might be seen as infeasible—for
Some proposals have called for
broader public sponsorship of
vaccines for uninsured adults.
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example in the case of a pandemic influenza vaccine—full government
purchase may be needed to stimulate early vaccine development and tar-
get vaccine to priority groups.
The Institute of Medicine has proposed a universal vaccine coverage strat-
egy that seeks to tie vaccine pricing explicitly to the societal value of spe-
cific products. This pricing scheme would, in essence, require the gov-
ernment to pay a premium for products that have significant public health
benefits. Although government purchasers would likely pay more for the
vaccine than they might if current price negotiation practices were em-
ployed, such a pricing mechanism has the potential to assure more stable
supply for a broader variety of products. This recommendation was
recognized as a bold break from current practice by the issuing IOM Com-
mittee. While the recommendation generated some debate, it did not gen-
erate political consideration when released.
In theory, premium pricing by government purchasers could be further
expanded to the global vaccine market, with industrialized nations explic-
itly subsidizing the cost of producing vaccine sold in the developing world.
This type of mechanism could be particularly relevant for a future HIV/
AIDS vaccine, which has commercial potential in the United States and
Europe but less paying demand in areas of the world with the greatest
disease burden. Manufacturers’ interest in moving a product past the vac-
cine discovery stage toward development and ultimately product approval,
may be dampened by concerns that political pressures will severely con-
strain price, both domestically and globally. At the same time, an effective
HIV/AIDS vaccine threatens revenue related to the sale of antiretroviral
treatments, further weakening the business case for vaccine investments.
Government guarantees to purchase the product at premium pricing has
the potential to address these legitimate financial interests.
Usage recommendations or mandates — Even when government is
not directly involved in vaccine purchase decisions, government policies
can have a dramatic impact on vaccine demand. The vaccination recom-
mendations promulgated by government-sponsored advisory bodies,
such as the ACIP, can be tremendously influential in determining the poli-
cies of professional societies, like the American Academy of Pediatrics,
and in directly encouraging health care providers and consumers to uti-
lize a particular vaccine product. In some cases, government mandates
related to vaccination requirements for admission to public schools or
foreign travel can also significantly affect the demand for particular vac-
cines. While school-related vaccine policies are more commonly made at
the state and local level, federal guidance and funding conditions can be
very important factors in these decisions. Social marketing campaigns to
improve public understanding and acceptance of these recommendations
and mandates can also increase demand.
Injury compensation programs — Although compensation programs are
usually viewed as a component of the “push” strategy to limit manufac-
turers’ liability costs, such programs also serve as a “pull” mechanism by
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increasing consumers’ willingness to be vaccinated. Assurances that com-
pensation will be forthcoming if a vaccine-related injury is sustained may
increase demand by encouraging consumers to comply with vaccine rec-
ommendations. Such encouragement is perhaps most important for vac-
cines where the consumer has a high degree of latitude in choosing
whether to be vaccinated and a low perceived risk regarding the disease
threat targeted by the vaccine. For example, some believe that participa-
tion of health care providers in the recent campaign to inoculate
first responders against smallpox was negatively influenced by delays in
establishing compensation provisions.
Insurance mandates — State and federal mandates that require insurers
to cover particular vaccines can have a significant impact on consumer
demand for these products. Insurance mandates reduce out-of-pocket ex-
penses for consumers and significantly decrease the financial barriers to
vaccine uptake. However, constraints related to ERISA (the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act) may diminish the effect of federal policies
in this regard.
Market exclusivity — Strategies that seek to strengthen the intellectual
property rights associated with vaccine development do not increase
demand levels per se, but they do guarantee that the innovating manu-
facturer will fully capture existing demand. The models for market ex-
clusivity incentives are based on the existing programs for orphan drugs
(the Orphan Drug Act, P.L. 97-414) and pediatric drug testing (Best Phar-
maceuticals for Children Act, P.L. 107-109). The fundamental idea is that
companies undertaking research on particular types of products (such
as bioterror countermeasures, including vaccines) could extend the pe-
riod of exclusive marketing rights provided under patent law.
Due in part to the problematic nature of patent protections in the vac-
cine field, modifications of this approach have been proposed. Some
proposed policies would provide for market exclusivity protection out-
side of the patent framework, others would offer “wild card” patent
extensions to alternative products in the manufacturer’s portfolio. Such
wild card provisions are a very attractive stimulus to large pharmaceu-
tical companies. Companies that received wild card extensions for
bioterrorism work could get an immediate payback from continued sales
and profits from large, established products. The extensions would carry
a potentially high cost to society through private and public purchasers
in the form of longer periods of premium pricing for successful drugs.
As a major purchaser of drugs through many programs (Medicaid,
Medicare, Veterans Affairs, and Department of Defense), the federal
government would absorb the higher costs from wild card extensions.
In effect, such provisions would provide an indirect and “off budget”
subsidy for bioterrorism research.
The intellectual property incentives appear to be most attractive to new
companies considering entering the vaccine field. Some large established
Intellectual property
incentives appear
most attractive to
new companies enter-
ing the vaccine field.
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vaccine companies have indicated, however, that patent extensions might be
a less attractive incentive than enhanced liability protections.36
Important issues to be resolved regarding intellectual property stimuli
schemes include the types of firms that could qualify for the extended
protections, the point in product development at which enhanced mar-
ket rights would be bestowed, the length of extensions, and the number
of extensions that could be applied to specific products.
CONCLUSION
In general, push and pull strategies share one common characteristic:
governmental resources are mobilized to ensure that vaccine markets func-
tions in a manner consistent with public health goals. Although these
strategies and their models differ significantly, most entail government
financial support in one form or another to stimulate the vaccine market.
The policy challenges lie in identifying which disease threats merit gov-
ernment investment in vaccine development and production, selecting
market support strategies specifically appropriate for each vaccine prod-
uct or candidate identified, and determining what level of resources is
needed to create effective incentives.
Scientific, demographic, economic, and political realities will converge dif-
ferently for different vaccines. For this reason, difficult policy decisions will
likely need to be made on a vaccine-by-vaccine basis. For some vaccines,
such as pediatric vaccines that are also used in the general population,
additional policy interventions may not be necessary. For others, increased
supports may be needed. The potential societal value of a specific vaccine
or vaccine candidate, the degree to which market mechanisms are failing
to achieve this potential and the political will needed to mobilize correc-
tive public resources must be considered and balanced against each other.
A clearer framework for measuring the success of this balancing act will
encourage rational investments and workable interventions.
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